It would not have been immediately
obvious to send African soldiers into battle in the Far East .
Never before had such a large contingent travelled so far from the African
continent. It could not be ascertained how African troops would stand up to the
Japanese, either. Neither British nor Indian units had had much success by 1943
– and at that time, the reputation of the Japanese soldier stood at its
highest. The West and East Africans had a decent reputation of their own after
victories against native levies in the East African and Abyssinian campaigns,
and against Mussolini’s Blackshirts. The Japanese, however, were to prove an
altogether tougher enemy. They were more skilful, more ruthless and better
armed. Experience alone was no great indicator of how African troops would
stand up to such an enemy, especially in the unforgiving Far Eastern climate. Despite
the risks, the decision was taken to send the first brigade of East African
troops to Ceylon
early in 1942 – although it did not prove possible to use them in action for a
long while. West African troops were initially unavailable – they were tied-up
in their colonies, protecting them from attack through Vichy West Africa.
The concept of a British Imperial
African Army is something that many are not familiar with. Its foundations date
back to 1916, when the Colonial Office found itself pressed by a lobby in
Parliament demanding the creation of a large black army. The idea had been
promoted since 1914, mainly by men with imperial backgrounds. From July 1917,
the lobby was led by Josiah Wedgwood, a man who had just returned from active
service in East Africa . He argued that
colonial governments should abandon their ‘benevolent neutrality’ and raise
troops for the fighting line ‘to replace white troops when the scarcity of
these gets more pronounced’.[1]
While the Colonial Office remained sceptical, Wedgwood claimed that the War
Office too was hostile to the idea of a large African Army:
Churchill backed up my efforts to get
coloured peoples recruited for the Army… as concerns the coloured army he was
no doubt anxious for men, I for raising the status of the coloured races; and
we failed because the War Office thought it undesirable to put coloured people
on a par with white men. It might put ideas into their heads.[2]
Wedgwood’s intention of ‘raising
the status of the coloured races’ was not entirely honourable. He made no
secret of his belief that an African army was necessary ‘because we do not want
all the whites killed – to put it bluntly. To slow down the rate of killing of
our own men and to eke out the finest race on earth.’[3]
The Colonial Office resisted the
idea of using black troops outside Africa . They
had several reasons: African soldiers had lower levels of training; they could
not survive in temperate climates, and were considered generally unreliable. It
was also agreed that African troops were mercenaries who fought for money and
therefore had to be used carefully. Despite their assertions, the Colonial
Office allowed the use of West African troops in the East African campaign in
mid-1916 – but said that it was a ‘complete delusion’ to suppose that a large-scale
recruitment could take place.[4]
By the end of 1917, the Colonial
Office was forced to concede that African troops may be employed outside Africa . The First World War was lasting longer than
expected, and there was a very real manpower crisis. The Army Council doubted
the value of the East Africans, but the West African troops were to be kept
intact. They had proved themselves in two campaigns outside their home colonies,
and were therefore considered a suitable reserve for any emergency that may
arise in the Empire. In July 1918, the War Office talked of sending a West
African Service Brigade to India ,
but its eventual destination was fixed on Palestine .
However, a lack of shipping and the eventual end of the war meant that the West
Africans stayed where they were.
There were two groups of opponents
against the formation of a large black army for use outside of Africa : the humanitarians, and those who feared the
legacy of armed and disciplined African soldiers.[5]
Would European colonial supremacy be threatened by the creation of such an army?
A Colonial Office official said on record in 1915:
It must not be forgotten that a West
African native trained to use of arms and filled with a new degree of
self-confidence by successful encounters with forces armed and led by Europeans
was not likely to be more amenable to discipline in peace time.[6]
Interestingly, a large degree of
support came from the West African elite, who were generally supportive of the
British war effort. They hoped that African loyalty would be rewarded with
post-war constitutional reforms – a theme that would ring true in future
conflicts.
[1] House of
Commons Debates, vol.84, cols. 1530-6 (25 Aug 1916).
[2] Josiah
Wedgwood, Memoirs of a Fighting Life (London , 1941), p.134-5.
[3] The Daily Chronicle, ‘African Manpower’, 7 Nov 1916, p.4.
[4] D.
Killingray, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’ Journal of African History, Vol.20, No.3 (1979), p.426.
[5] Killingray,
‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’, p.427.
[6] A. Osuntokun , Nigeria
No comments:
Post a Comment